Resumen Nos proponemos analizar los mecanismos lingüístico-discursivos movilizados por los dos candidatos a las últimas elecciones colombianas de 2014. Nuestro objetivo es poner de manifiesto las diferentes estructuras discursivas utilizadas por los dos candidatos durante el debate entre la primera y la segunda vuelta del 9 de junio de 2014. Este estudio se centra en ciertas formas recurrentes utilizadas por los dos candidatos con el propósito de exponer sus argumentos y desarrollarlos. En primer lugar, podemos constatar el uso frecuente de (...) ciertos elementos deícticos, tanto de persona como de tiempo, por parte de cada candidato. Estos elementos fueron utilizados con un objetivo particular en el discurso de cada cual: el candidato presidente utilizó más frecuentemente la primera persona del plural exclusiva y el tiempo verbal perfecto para poner de manifiesto los logros en su primer periodo presidencial; mientras que el candidato opositor utilizó con más frecuencia la primera persona del singular y la primera persona del plural inclusiva además de los tiempos verbales del presente para expresar su voluntad de ser presidente, así como los tiempos verbales del perfecto, no retrospectivos, para criticar a su oponente. En segundo lugar, cada candidato construyó una progresión argumentativa alrededor de una sola estrategia discursiva centrada en el tema de la paz. Por un lado, el candidato presidente Juan Manuel Santos utilizó un campo semántico del cambio y de la paz determinada. Por el otro, el candidato opositor Oscar Iván Zuluaga usó un campo semántico alrededor de la paz indeterminada y con condiciones. Estas dos grandes estrategias engloban otras estrategias discursivas que trataremos de detallar en nuestro estudio, a saber: el empleo de fórmulas y de sus contrarios con el objetivo de legitimar la palabra de cada quien y de deslegitimar la palabra del adversario, entre otras. (shrink)

Joaquim Hernandez-Dispaux propose une étude qui est le fruit d’un long contact avec les notes préparatoires ayant servi à la rédaction de la trilogie sur le christianisme de Michel Henry, où il révèle l’influence latente de Cl. Tresmontant dans la compréhension henryenne du milieu johannique. Ce n’est toutefois pas tant le parangon de la « philosophie chrétienne » qui retient M. Henry, mais ses recherches autour d’un Christ hébreu, essentiellement utilisées pour fonder une sorte d’archéologie christologique permettant de (...) remonter vers la parole la plus originaire. Par cette médiation inattendue, on voit combien M. Henry recherche à la fois la fondation transcendantale de la parole christique dans son authenticité la plus originaire, mais aussi sa radicale différence par rapport aux mondes grec et juif, celui-ci voyant passer le point de rupture par rapport à la question de l’immanence. (shrink)

A partir de la duplicidad del aparecer, principio básico de la fenomenología radical elaborada por Michel Henry en continuidad y ruptura con el proyecto husserliano, se pueden plantear ciertas notas para una antropología filosófica. Esta fenomenología propone la vida como fenómeno originario y, al definirla como autoafección, postula la necesidad de reconocer en ella, por principio, la presencia de una ipseidad, de modo que no hay vida sin viviente ni viviente sin vida. Determinar cuáles sean las notas que definen (...) la condición de dicho viviente sería la tarea de la antropología fenomenológica correspondiente. En atención a la enunciada duplicidad, dicho viviente —que es el hombre— ha de ser comprendido como pasividad radical respecto de la vida y como actividad constituyente respecto del mundo. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo nos preguntaremos por la posibilidad de elaborar una filosofía de la religión a partir de los supuestos de la fenomenología de la vida de Michel Henry, y por los senderos que esta supondría. Esta tarea nos demanda explicitar los principios base de su propuesta fenomenológica, indagar por la fidelidad del autor a dichos principios en su tematización del cristianismo y, finalmente, enunciar los caminos que se originan de esta fenomenología para una comprensión filosófica de la (...) experiencia religiosa. Tal será, entonces, la estructura de nuestro texto, que pretende situarse en el ensamble del trabajo filosófico de presupuestos Henry definido por él mismo bajo un doble aspecto: “7.a elaboración de los fundamentales que definen la duplicidad del aparecer, y la puesta en práctica de estos presupuestos en la compresión de diversos problemas o diversas filosofías”. (shrink)

Cet article présente le travail de déchiffrage, de transcription et d’édition des notes préparatoires à Paroles du Christ, dernier ouvrage de Michel Henry. Ces notes inédites, particulièrement nombreuses, sont accompagnées de commentaires scientifiques et d’une table des citations bibliques pour aider le travail des chercheurs.

Cet article tente d’analyser les rapports de d’Henri Matisse à la danse. Si celle-ci fut l’objet de nombreuses de ses œuvres, elle se présente aussi comme une méthode qui participe de son processus de création.

Introduction La question de l’érôs est d’une extrême importance philosophique, et singulièrement dans le cadre de la pensée de M. Henry, mais elle est aussi d’une terrible et redoutable difficulté, parce qu’elle ne laisse pas indifférent et nous touche précisément sur le plan des affects, des concepts et du langage comme possibilité du dire, c’est-à-dire ces ressources que nous allons tenter de mobiliser pour évoquer un objet sensible et complexe, au regard duquel M. Henry pense, en plus et (...) p... (shrink)

Do children have a theory of mind? If they do, at what age is it acquired? What is the content of the theory, and how does it differ from that of adults? The Child's Theory of Mind integrates the diverse strands of this rapidly expanding field of study. It charts children's knowledge about a fundamental topic - the mind - and characterizes that developing knowledge as a coherent commonsense theory, strongly advancing the understanding of everyday theories as well as the (...) commonsense theory of mind. Wellman presents evidence that children as young as age three do possess a commonsense theory of mind - that they grasp the distinction between mental constructs and physical entities and that they have an understanding of the relationship between individuals' mental states and their overt actions. He delves in detail into questions about the nature of adults' commonsense theories of mind and about the nature of commonsense theories. Wellman then examines the content of the three-year-old's theory of mind, the nature of children's notions of mind before age three, the changes in the theory during subsequent development from ages three to six, and the young child's conception of mind in comparison with those of older children and adults. Henry M. Wellman is a Professor in the Department of Psychology and the Center for Human Growth and Development at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. (shrink)

This landmark book is now reissued in a new edition that has been vastly rewritten and updated to respond to recent Kantian literature.

Bringing together evolutionary biology, psychology, and philosophy, Henry Plotkin presents a new science of knowledge, one that traces an unbreakable link between instinct and our ability to know.

En “Elogio de la profanación”, Giorgio Agamben sitúa la religión como aquella instancia que separa la esfera divina y la mantiene inaccesible a los hombres: lo sagrado, de este modo, se constituiría como un campo inaccesible, segregado o separado de la esfera humana. Profanar, por el contrario, consistiría en levantar las barreras que instituye la separación, tanto en sus formas religiosas como seculares. Lo que analizamos en el texto es esta tensión entre separación y profanación, con el objetivo de mostrar (...) que existe en el pensamiento de Agamben todo un gesto filosófico que tiene que ver, precisamente, con la crítica de la separación. (shrink)

Once capitalism’s responsibility in the current ecological crisis is recognized, the necessary response of ecology and environmental activism is insufficient to access the essence of the techno-science that decides our way of inhabiting the planet. The “heideggerian” eco-dicy proposes from the critique of the metaphysical essence of the technique, a new understanding of dwelling that does justice to the different modalities of the living from the ontological difference in which our dwelling of the Earth finds its meaning.

cognitive, neuropsychological, and neurophysiological studies of both memory and consciousness. Before proceeding further, some discussion of terminology is necessary. It comes as no surprise to state that "consciousness" is one of the ...

Since 1992, Border Crossings has show cased Henry A. Giroux's extraordinary range as a thinker by bringing together a series of essays that refigure the relationship between post-modernism, feminism, cultural studies and critical pedagogy. With discussions of topics including the struggle over academic canon, the role of popular culture in the curriculum and the cultural war the New Right has waged on schools, Giroux identified the most pressing issues facing critical educators at the turn of the century. In this (...) revised edition, Giroux reflects on the limits and possibilities of border crossings in the 21st century. "Borders" in our post 9/11 world have not been collapsing, he argues, but vigorously rebuilt. In order to have a truly critically engaged citizenry the challenges of these new "borders"- such as the increased militarization of public spaces, the rise of neo-liberalism, and the war in Iraq- must play a vital role in any debate on school and pedagogy. (shrink)

Modernity is founded on the belief that the world we build is a human invention, not a part of nature. The ecological consequences of this idea have been catastrophic. We have laid waste to natural ecosystems, replacing them with fundamentally unsustainable human designs. With time running out to address the environmental crises we have caused, our best path forward is to turn to nature for guidance. In this book, Henry Dicks explores the philosophical significance of a revolutionary approach to (...) sustainable innovation: biomimicry. The term describes the application and adaptation of strategies found in nature to the development of artificial products and systems, such as passive cooling techniques modeled on termite mounds or solar cells modeled on leaves. Dicks argues that biomimicry, typically seen as just a design strategy, can also serve as the basis for a new environmental philosophy that radically alters how we understand and relate to the natural world. By showing how we can imitate, emulate, and learn from nature, biomimicry points us toward a genuinely sustainable way of inhabiting the earth. Rooted in philosophy, The Biomimicry Revolution has profound implications spanning the natural sciences, design, architecture, sustainability studies, science and technology studies, and the environmental humanities. It presents a sweeping reconception of what philosophy can be and offers a powerful new vision of terrestrial existence. (shrink)

Researchers do not owe their subjects the same level of care that physicians owe patients, but they owe more than merely what the research protocol stipulates. In keeping with the dynamics of the relationship between researcher and subject, they have limited but substantive fiduciary obligations.

This book is both a critique of the concept of the rights-holding, free, autonomous individual and attendant ideology dominant in the contemporary West, and an account of an alternative view, that of the role-bearing, interrelated responsible person of classical Confucianism, suitably modified for addressing the manifold problems of today.

Few if any philosophical schools have championed family values as persistently as the early Confucians, and a great deal can be learned by attending to what they had to say on the subject. In the Confucian tradition, human morality and the personal realization it inspires are grounded in the cultivation of family feeling. One may even go so far as to say that, for China, family reverence was a necessary condition for developing any of the other human qualities of excellence. (...) On the basis of the present translation of the Xiaojing (Classic of Family Reverence) and supplemental passages found in other early philosophical writings, Professors Rosemont and Ames articulate a specifically Confucian conception of "role ethics" that, in its emphasis on a relational conception of the person, is markedly different from most early and contemporary dominant Western moral theories. This Confucian role ethics takes as its inspiration the perceived necessity of family feeling as the entry point in the development of moral competence and as a guide to the religious life as well. In the lengthy introduction, two senior scholars offer their perspective on the historical, philosophical, and religious dimensions of the Xiaojing. Together with this introduction, a lexicon of key terms presents a context for the Xiaojing and provides guidelines for interpreting the text historically in China as well as suggesting its contemporary significance for all societies. The inclusion of the Chinese text adds yet another dimension to this important study. The Chinese Classic of Family Reverence is sure to appeal to specialists of comparative and Chinese philosophy and to all readers interested in the enduring importance of the family. (shrink)

So considered, Hume is viewed as a naturalist, whose project in the first three parts of the first book of the Treatise is to provide an account of the ...

The notion that it is useful to specify norms progressively in order to resolve doubts about what to do, which I developed initially in a 1990 article, has been only partly assimilated by the bioethics literature. The thought is not just that it is helpful to work with relatively specific norms. It is more than that: specification can replace deductive subsumption and balancing. Here I argue against two versions of reliance on balancing that are prominent in recent bioethical discussions. Without (...) meaning to address the substance or the overall merits of either view I criticize, I attack Gert, Culver and Clouser's implicit reliance on some overall dimension of balancing as a basis of resolving conflicts among norms and Beauchamp and Childress's residual acceptance of 'justified balancing'. The former authors' description of resolving conflicts depends upon a type of value commensurability that (as they otherwise seem to admit) does not obtain, while the latter authors' role for justified balancing would be better served by continued specification. (shrink)

This landmark book is now reissued in a new edition that has been vastly rewritten and updated to respond to recent Kantian literature. It includes a new discussion of the Third Analogy, a greatly expanded discussion of Kant’s _Paralogisms, _and entirely new chapters dealing with Kant’s theory of reason, his treatment of theology, and the important Appendix to the Dialectic. _Praise for the earlier edition: _ “Probably the most comprehensive and substantial study of the Critique of Pure Reason written by (...) any American philosopher.... This is a splendid book.”—Lewis White Beck “This masterful study... will most certainly join the canon of required reading for future interpreters of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Superbly organized and lucidly written.”—Garrett Green, _Journal of Religion_. (shrink)

Although a good deal has been written about Kant's conception of free will in recent years, there has been no serious attempt to examine in detail the development of his views on the topic. This book endeavours to remedy the situation by tracing Kant's thoughts on free will from his earliest discussions of it in the 1750s through to his last accounts in the 1790s. This developmental approach is of interest for at least two reasons. First, it shows that the (...) path that led Kant to view freedom as a transcendental power that is both radically distinct from and compatible with the causality of nature was a winding one. Second, it indicates that, despite the variety of views of free will that Kant held at various times, the concept occupied a central place in his thought, because it was the point of union between his theoretical and practical philosophy. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill was the leading British philosopher of the nineteenth century and his famous essay Utilitarianism is the most influential statement of the philosophy of utilitarianism: that actions, laws, policies and institutions are to be evaluated by their utility or contribution to good or bad consequences. Henry West has written the most up-to-date and user-friendly introduction to utilitarianism available. The book serves as both a commentary to and interpretation of the text. It also defends Mill against his critics. (...) An appendix reviews in detail the structure and arguments of Utilitarianism. This book is primarily intended as a textbook for students in philosophy assigned to read Utilitarianism but it should also prove helpful to students and professionals in other fields such as political science, history and economics. (shrink)

It is strange to note so little discussion of the exclusion principle in the philosophical literature. Philosophers, largely engrossed in their perennial problems, are hardly aware of the fact that, during the last two decades, there has been introduced into physical methodology a principle of utmost philosophical importance, easily rivaling that of relativity and, in some respects, indeed that of causality. Discovered by Pauli in 1925, it immediately elucidated a whole realm of physical facts and was accepted by physicists with (...) wide acclaim. Called the exclusion principle—or Pauli principle, or principle of anti-symmetry—it was embodied in the axiomatics of quantum mechanics; its peculiar methodological significance passed out of view. (shrink)

The trouble with the idea of measurement is its seeming clarity, its obviousness, its implicit claim to finality in any inquisotory discourse. Its status in philosophy of science is taken to be utterly primitive; hence the difficulties it embodies, if any, tend to escape detection and scrutiny. Yet it cannot be primitive in the sense of being exempt from analysis; for if it were every measurement would require to be simply accepted as a protocol of truth, and one should never (...) ask which of two conflicting measurements is correct, or preferable. Such questions are continually being asked, and their propriety in science indicates that even measurement, with its implication of simplicity and adroitness, points beyond itself to other matters of importance on which it relies for validation. (shrink)

Martha Nussbaum has powerfully argued in Frontiers ofJustice and elsewhere that John Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory cannot usefully be deployed to deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled. To counter this claim, this article deploys Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory in order to deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled—or, since, as Nussbaum stresses, we all have some degree of disability—for the severely disabled. In this way, rather than questioning one by one Nussbaum’s interpretive claims (...) about Rawls’s view, one can simply see how the Rawlsian framework can work in application to this issue. Following Rawls’s lead, the paper utilizes the idealized “initial choice situation” as an analytic and comparative device for examining alternative principles of justice, developing three different interpretations of the initial choice situation that each correspond to a different set of principles that apply to people of all levels of disability. One of these sets of principles is a simple extension of Rawls’s, one is very close to what Nussbaum herself recommends, and the third is a kind of hybrid. In this way, it is shown not only that Rawls’s social-contract device can usefully be applied to these issues, but also that it is helpful for exploring the deep commitments underlying each of these competing sets of principles. (shrink)

William James was one of the most frequently cited authors in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, but the attention paid to James’s Principles of Psycho- logy in that work is typically explained in terms of James having ‘committed in a clear, exemplary manner, fundamental errors in the philosophy of mind.’ (Goodman 2002, p. viii.) The most notable of these ‘errors’ was James’s purported commitment to a conception of language as ‘private’. Commentators standardly treat James as committed to a conception of language as (...) private, and the most notorious instance of this commitment can purportedly be found in his discussion of the feelings associated with logical terms like ‘and’, ‘if ’ and ‘but’ in the Principles’s chapter, ‘The Stream of Thought’. However, the received view stands in need of serious re-evaluation. In particular, there is little reason to think that James’s notorious discussion of the ‘if-feeling’ should be understood as an attempt to give an account of the meaning of ‘if ’ (indeed, there is little reason to even think that Wittgenstein interpreted him this way). The picture of our ideas developed in ‘The Stream of Thought’ sits badly with any theory that identifies meanings with ideas in this way, and while James’s chapter on ‘Conception’ (as well as some portions of Some Problems of Philosophy) has also been portrayed as committing James to the in principle privacy of language, it will be argued here that James’s account of our ‘conceptions’ is radically different from that of the private linguist. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kant's Critique of Berkeley HENRY E. ALLISON THE CLAIMTHAT KANT'S IDEALISM,or at least certain strands of it, is essentially identical to that of Berkeley has a long and distinguished history. It was first voiced by several of Kant's contemporaries such as Mendelssohn, Herder, Hamann, Pistorius and Eberhard who attacked the alleged subjectivism of the Critique of Pure Reason. 1 This viewpoint found its sharpest contemporary expression in the (...) notorious Garve-Feder review to which Kant responded at length in the Prolegomena. In subsequent times it has been championed by Schopenhauer, and most nineteenth century German commentators on the relation between the two philosophers. 2 In addition, it has been, and continues to be, the prevailing view of the vast majority of British writers on Kant, including, with significant qualifications, Norman Kemp Smith. 3 This tradition continues despite the fact that Kant specifically, and in no uncertain terms, repudiated this identification in the Prolegomena and the second edition of the Critique. In both works he responds to the charges of subjectivism, and in so doing distinguishes his position from that of Berkeley, who in the eighteenth century was commonly regarded as a solipsist and denier of the "external world." 4 In contra-distinction to Kant's own critical or transcendental idealism, which explains the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge within the realm of possible experience, Berkeley is characterized as a "dogmatic" or "visionary idealist." He is judged guilty of "degrading bodies to mere illusion" (B69), of regarding things in space as "merely imaginary entities" (B274), and of holding with all "genuine idealists" that: "all knowledge through the senses and experience is i Cf. Hans Vaihinger, Commentar zu Kant's Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig, 1892), II, 494-505. Cf. Friederich Fredericks, Der Phainomenale Idealisraus Berkeley's und Kant's (Berlin, 1871); Robert Zimmerman, "Ober Kant's Widerlegung des Idealismus yon Berkeley" (Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, Philox.-hist. Kl.), LXVIII (1871); Gustav Dieckert, tiber dos Verhiiltnis des Berkeleyschen ldealismus zu Kantischen Vernun]tkritik (Konitz, 1888). Tiffs is a consequence of the general British tendency to view Kant in phenomenalist terms. A typical recent example is found in P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London, 1966). Kemp Smith in his Commentary to Kant's Critique o[ Pure Reason (2nd ed., rev., 1923) takes greaZ pains to distinguish between the subjectivist strand in Kant's thought, which is essentially identical to Berkeley's position, and the genuine critical doctrine which stands side by side with it in the text. 9 Cf. I-I.M. Bracken, The Early Reception of Berkeley's Materialism 1710-1733, rev. ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965). [43] 44 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY nothing but sheer illusion, and only in the ideas of pure understanding is there truth" (374). 5 One of the chief reasons for the continuation of the Kant-Berkeley tradition is that these, and similar statements about Berkeley, which we find in these works and in Kant's correspondenc e with Beck, have not been taken very seriously by Kant's critics. They are usually dismissed as obvious misinterpretations, due to Kant's ignorance of Berkeley's actual writings, and of his reliance upon distorted second and third hand accounts of Berkeley's thought such as is to be found in Beattie. Furthermore, this view is often supported by the philological reflection that Kant did not read English, and that Berkeley's writings were not yet available in German translation. 6 The philological argument, however, loses much of its force when we consider that there was indeed a German translation of Berkeley's Dialogues, which although apparently unknown to nineteenth century scholars, was readily accessible to Kant. This is to be found, together with a translation of Collier's Clavis Universalis and critical analyses, in a work by the professor of philosophy at Rostock, Johann Christian Eschenbach, entitled: Samlung der vornehmsten Schri[tsteller die die tFirklichkeit ihres eignen K~rpers und der ganzen Ki~rperwelt leugnen (Rostock, 1756). Furthermore, in addition to this work, which was probably known to Kant, there is Berkeley's important Latin work, De Motu (1721), as well as French translations of many of... (shrink)

This article investigates to what extent protocols for dynamicdisputes, i.e., disputes in which the information base can vary at differentstages, can be justified in terms of logics for defeasible argumentation. Firsta general framework is formulated for dialectical proof theories for suchlogics. Then this framework is adapted to serve as a framework for protocols fordynamic disputes, after which soundness and fairness properties are formulated for such protocols relative to dialectical proof theories. It then turns out that certaintypes of protocols that are (...) perfectly fine with a static information base, arenot sound or fair in a dynamic setting. Finally, a natural dynamic protocolis defined for which soundness and fairness can be established. (shrink)